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* 3. ManuscriptAbstract
The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators pro-
vide a ﬁtness beneﬁt to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian
selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or
defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform
poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful
mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner’s
dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider struc-
tured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the
population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely
to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we
present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of
defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages:
ﬁrst, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they
uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global
equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions,
cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of
defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact
clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the ﬁrst quantitative as-
sessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and ﬁnd that the
macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about
the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.
21 Introduction
Cooperation is a fundamental principle of biological systems that organizes lower level entities
into higher level units – genes form chromosomes, cells form organisms, and individuals form
societies (Maynard Smith & Szathm´ ary, 1995). However, the emergence of cooperation poses
an enduring challenge to evolutionary biologists: If cooperation is costly to the individual and
beneﬁts only the interaction partners, then Darwinian selection should favour non-cooperating
defectors and eliminate cooperation. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, this outcome
is inevitable, despite the fact that mutual cooperation is preferred over mutual defection. The
most prominent mathematical metaphor to study such interactions is given by the prisoner’s
dilemma: in pairwise interactions, cooperation (C) provides a beneﬁt b to the partner at some
cost c to the cooperator (b > c), while defection (D) neither bears any costs nor provides any
beneﬁts. The net gains for the player’s joint behaviour can be written in the form of a payoff
matrix:
If co-player cooperates If co-player defects
Payoff to cooperator: b − c −c
Payoff to defector: b 0
(1)
Strictly speaking the prisoner’s dilemma is deﬁned in terms of the ranking of the four payoffs.
This particular parameterization in terms of b and c is biologically intuitive and mathematically
convenient. The crucial point is that defection pays more irrespective of the partner’s decision
and is thus the dominant strategy. Cooperators will therefore dwindle and eventually everybody
ends up with a payoff of zero instead of the more favourable reward for mutual cooperation
b − c. This characterizes the conﬂict of interest between individuals and the group, which
deﬁnes social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980, Hauert et al., 2006). Over the last decades, different
mechanisms have been proposed to promote and maintain cooperation (Hamilton, 1964, Hauert
et al., 2002, 2007, Nowak, 2006b, Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, Trivers, 1971, Wilson & Sober,
1994) including spatially structured populations with limited local interactions (Nowak & May,
31992). If individuals are arranged on a lattice and interact only with their nearest neighbours,
then cooperators may thrive by forming compact clusters, which increases interactions with
other cooperators while reducing exploitation by defectors.
Spatial structure affects the evolutionary process in general 2 × 2 games, i.e. in pairwise
interactions with two strategic options (Hauert, 2002, Ohtsuki & Nowak, 2006a), and notably
enables cooperators to survive in populations playing the prisoner’s dilemma. Considering the
equilibriumfrequencies ofcooperatorsanddefectors inlatticepopulationsdemonstratesthatthe
clustering advantages are substantial for small cost-to-beneﬁt ratios c/b, but are unable to offset
the exploitation by defectors above a threshold value, c/b > λ, such that cooperators disappear
(Szab´ o & T˝ oke, 1998). For increasing c/b, the system undergoes a critical phase transition,
characterized by diverging ﬂuctuations in the cooperator and defector frequencies (Szab´ o &
Hauert, 2002a). These results have led to the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily
beneﬁcial for cooperation. While this holds for prisoner’s dilemma interactions, it is not univer-
sally applicable. In fact, in the snowdrift game – a closely related social dilemma with relaxed
conditions such that cooperators and defectors can co-exist under conditions where cooperators
are doomed in the prisoner’s dilemma – spatial structure often turns out to be detrimental to
cooperation (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005, Hauert, 2006a, Hauert & Doebeli, 2004).
In ﬁnite populations, evolution is stochastic such that the combination of selection and ran-
dom drift eventually leads to the ﬁxation of one or the other strategic type (Nowak, 2006a,
Nowak et al., 2004). In such situations, cooperation is favoured if the ﬁxation probability of a
single cooperator, ρC, in a defector population exceeds the ﬁxation probability of a neutral mu-
tant (ρC > 1/N where N is the population size). For weak selection, i.e. if payoff differences
between cooperators and defectors are small, ρC is analytically accessible for various types of
microscopic updating mechanisms (Ohtsuki et al., 2006, Taylor et al., 2007). In particular, for
the payoff matrix (1), the condition ρC > 1/N implies that the ﬁxation probability of a single
defector, ρD, in a cooperator population is ρD < 1/N (Taylor et al., 2007, Wild & Traulsen,
42007). Hence, if mutations are rare, the population spends more time in the cooperator state
than in the defector state. In the prisoner’s dilemma, if the death of a randomly chosen individ-
ual triggers a competition among its neighbours to repopulate the vacant site with a success rate
proportional to their payoffs, then a particularly simple condition is obtained: evolution favours
cooperation whenever b > c   k holds, where k denotes the number of interaction partners.
This work complements studies on prisoner’s dilemma games in structured populations by
investigatingtheprocessofcooperatorsinvadingaworldofdefectors. Wedemonstratethatafter
an initial relaxation time, the number of cooperators always grows quadratically irrespective
of the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio c/b, and we ﬁnd that two distinct modes of growth exist: (i) for
small c/b, cooperators expand essentially as a single ever growing cluster whereas (ii) for larger
c/b, cooperators form an increasing number of small clusters with little variation in size. Our
simulations conﬁrm that the probability of invasion is essentially independent of the initial
numberofcooperators providedthat they form at least a3×3 cluster(Hauert, 2001, Killingback
et al., 1999, Page et al., 2000). In addition, our simulations show that behind the invasion front,
cooperators and defectors quickly reach a local equilibrium, which supports analytical results
based on pair approximation (Ellner et al., 1998, Le Gaillard et al., 2003, Ohtsuki et al., 2006,
van Baalen & Rand, 1998).
2 Model
In order to investigate the invasion dynamics of cooperators in detail, consider a square lattice
S×S where every site is occupied by a single individual. Initially, all individuals are defectors,
except for a s × s cluster of cooperators in the centre of the lattice (s = 1,3,5,...,15 and
30). Each individual engages in pairwise interactions within its Moore neighbourhood, i.e.
with the eight nearest neighbours reachable by a chess king’s move. The payoffs accrued in
these interactions determine the individual’s reproductive ﬁtness (or its propensity to propagate
5its strategy). Rescaling of the payoff matrix (1) reduces the prisoner’s dilemma to a single
parameter c/b:



1 0
1 + c/b c/b


. (2)
Theupdating of the strategyof every individualas well as of the populationcan be implemented
in various ways as illustrated by the diversity of approaches in the literature (see e.g. Hauert,
2002, Nakamaru et al., 1997, 1998, Ohtsuki & Nowak, 2006a,b, Szab´ o & T˝ oke, 1998). The
characteristic features of the invasion process that we present here, however, are essentially in-
dependent of the detailed updating procedure. We veriﬁed this robustness using various update
rules of the individuals (fully deterministic to highly stochastic) and of the population (syn-
chronous updating or non-overlappinggenerations versus asynchronous updating or continuous
time). For the simulations presented in the following section, we chose asynchronous updating
of the population and an individual updating of intermediate stochasticity, which can be inter-
preted as a spatial analogue of the replicator dynamics: (i) a focal individual x is randomly
selected to reassess and update its strategy; (ii) the payoff of x and of all its neighbours are
determined and (iii) the focal player x probabilistically compares its payoff with the payoff of
its neighbours. x adopts the strategy of neighbour y with a probability wy = (Py − Px)/∆
provided that the payoff of y exceeds the payoff of x, and with probability zero otherwise.
∆ = Pmax−Pmin is a normalization constant to ensure wy ∈ [0,1]. Given wy for all neighbours,
x does not change strategy with probability px =
 
y(1−wy). With probability 1−px the focal
player adopts the strategy of a neighbour with relative probability wy/w where w =
 
y wy.
This approach recovers the replicator dynamics (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998, Taylor & Jonker,
1978) in the limit of inﬁnite population sizes and large neighbourhoods where the focal individ-
ual compares its payoff to a single randomly chosen neighbour.
The above microscopic update procedure refers to a mechanism where individualspreferen-
tially imitate the strategy of more successful neighbours. An equivalent interpretation in terms
6of replication can be obtained by translating the different probabilities into propensities that
each neighbour succeeds in placing clonal offspring on the focal site.
3 Results
3.1 Cooperator Survival
Cooperation is inherently prone to exploitation by defectors and thus the survival probability
of cooperators, σC, hinges on the cooperator’s ability to offset the costs of cooperation with
beneﬁts accrued from interactions with other cooperators. A single cooperator in a sea of de-
fectors performs poorly, and its only hope is to propagate its strategy through random drift.
Since players never adopt worse performing strategies in our setup, single cooperators never
survive and readily disappear. For other, more stochastic update rules the odds of survival are
not zero but the chances remain slim. For example, even if evolution favours cooperation in
the Moran process under weak selection, the survival probability of a single cooperator is only
of the order of 1/N and hence only for small population sizes reliable results can be achieved
through individual based simulations. Moreover, under weak selection random drift dominates,
which makes it much harder to extract characteristic features of the evolutionary process. In
contrast, our approach based on strong selection facilitates clear-cut conclusions.
For c/b < λ ≈ 0.15 the survival probability σC of an initial cluster of s × s cooperators
(s ≥ 3) is very high and only marginally affected by the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio c/b (see Fig. 1a).
The pivotal role of 3×3 clusters in determining whether cooperators thrive has been recognized Fig. 1
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earlier (Hauert, 2001, Killingback et al., 1999, Nowak & May, 1993, Page et al., 2000) and is
conﬁrmed by our results. For c/b < λ, cooperators can surviveby formingcompact clusters and
thereby minimizing exploitation by defectors. For c/b > λ however, the clustering advantage
provided by the spatial setting is insufﬁcient, and cooperators invariably go extinct irrespective
of their initial abundance.
73.2 Cooperator Expansion
Acloseinspectionoftheinvasionprocessofcooperatorsrevealstwodistinctdynamicalregimes:
an initial phase of slower growth giving way to a phase of signiﬁcantly faster expansion (see
Fig. 1b). The invasion dynamics in both phases follows a power function, i.e. the number of
cooperators nc increases as a function of time t according to nc(t) = ai tdi where ai indicates
the growth rate of cooperators in each phase (i = 1,2) and the exponents di characterize their
spreading in space. Estimates of the parameters ai,di were obtained by two separate ﬁts: the
ﬁrst ﬁt up to time T1, which marks the end of the ﬁrst phase, and the second ﬁt after T2, which
indicates the beginning of the second phase. The transient phase between T1 and T2 is ade-
quately described by a superposition of the two power functions: nc(t) = a1 td1 + a2 td2 (see
Fig. 1b).
In the ﬁrst phase, both parameters a1 and d1 decrease with increasing cost-to-beneﬁt ratios
c/b, which indicates slower growth under less favourable conditions for cooperators. The factor
a1 also depends on the size of the initial cluster of cooperators. The small exponents, d1 < 1,
are remarkable because an arbitrary but uniform spatial expansionprocess yields an exponentof
2 (or, more generally, an exponent of D in D-dimensional space). The reason for the observed
small d1 is that cooperators expand during the ﬁrst phase, but defectors simultaneously invade
the cooperator’s initial territory. This indicates that a local equilibration process among coop-
erators and defectors is taking place behind the invasion front. In line with this, the relaxation
time T1 of this initial phase increases with the size of the initial cluster and also increases for
larger cost-to-beneﬁt ratios c/b, because higher costs or smaller beneﬁts hinder the propagation
of cooperation.
In the second phase, the growth rate of cooperators a2 again decreases with increasing c/b-
ratios, but the growth exponent remains essentially constant at d2 ≈ 2, which conﬁrms the theo-
retical expectations of a uniform spatial expansion process. Note that d2 shows small variations
around 2 because the rate of growth is not locally uniform and depends on the cluster shape:
8cooperators along smooth edges have higher propensities to proliferate than cooperators sitting
on corners. However, as the expansion progresses and the number of cooperators increases,
such effects become less important and are averaged out, which suggests that limt→∞ d2 → 2
holds.
The growth exponents d1,d2 not only characterize the spreading of cooperators in space, but
also determine the growth of the region exposed to the invasion of cooperators or, equivalently,
determinethe informationpropagation speed. Thus, in the second phase, the number of individ-
uals that are aware of the invading cooperators grows approximately as N2(t) = α2 td2 ≈ α2 t2.
Note that N2(t) essentially corresponds to the area enveloping the not necessarily contigu-
ous cluster(s) of cooperators. The equilibrium frequency of cooperators is therefore given by
fc = limt→∞ nc(t)/N2(t). Note that nc(t)/N2(t) = a2/α2, which is independent of time. Thus,
if nc(t) and N2(t) are known at some particular times (they do not need to be measured simul-
taneously) good estimates of the equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors can be
obtained. In simulations, a convenient time T is deﬁned by the ﬁrst cooperator reaching the
boundary of the lattice. At this time, N2(T) = S2π/4 provides a good approximation with S2
representing the lattice or population size. Note that this tends to systematically overestimate
N2(T) because (i) the centre of the area covered by cooperators may have shifted over time and
(ii) only a single cooperator reached the boundary at time T. A conservative estimation of the
equilibrium fraction of cooperators fc is therefore given by
fc =
a2
α2
≈
a2T 2
N2(T)
=
4
S2π
a2T
2. (3)
For good estimates, T should lie well in the second regime of the invasion process. The estima-
tion of fc is not applicable to the ﬁrst growth phase because it relies on the fact that cooperators
and defectors behind the invasion front have reached a local equilibrium, and this is violated
in early stages of the invasion process. A summary of the ﬁt data and equilibrium estimates is
given in Table 1. Since N2(t) relates to the area affected by the invasion of cooperators, it indi- Table 1
about
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9cates an accessible quantity for experimental approaches, for example experiments of growing
microbial populations on plates.
3.3 Cluster Size
The fraction of cooperators fc depicted in Fig. 1b is linked to the spatial arrangement of co-
operators, which in turn is determined by the geometry, the updating and the payoff matrix.
Macroscopic features such as the number of contiguous clusters of cooperators, their typical
size as well as their shape during cooperator expansion reveal therefore interesting characteris-
tics of the underlying microscopic interactions. Fig. 2 shows typical snapshots of the distinct Fig. 2
about
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spatial patterns for two different values of the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio c/b at time T, i.e. when the
ﬁrst cooperator reaches the boundary of the necessarily ﬁnite lattice in our simulations. Under
benign conditions for cooperation (small c/b), usually a single large contiguous cluster of coop-
erators grows with small embedded specks of defectors. Only along the invasion front, several
isolated cooperators and tiny separated cooperator formations are found. A contiguous cluster
consists of cooperators that have at least one other cooperator among their neighbours. In con-
trast, under more hostile conditions for cooperation (larger c/b), cooperators form numerous
small compact clusters. Typically, none of these clusters host specks of defectors because they
would readily split the cluster into smaller ones.
For increasing c/b-ratios, the cluster size decreases, while the number of clusters increases
(see Fig. 3a). Note that for small c/b, the tiny cooperator formations along the invasion front
leadtoabimodaldistributionoftheclustersize. Inordertodeterminethetypicalaveragecluster
size and eliminate the effects of isolated cooperators without introducing an arbitrary threshold
size, the average cluster size is weighted such that the weight of each cluster corresponds to
its size. The cluster size and cluster count delineate two distinct regimes: for c/b < 0.1 (cf. Fig. 3
about
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Fig. 2a), few rather big clusters dominate the expansion process whereas for 0.1 < c/b < λ ≈
0.15 (cf. Fig. 2b), numerous compact clusters minimize exploitation by defectors. As noted
10before (cf. Fig. 1), λ marks the extinction threshold of cooperators such that for c/b > λ the
clustering advantages of cooperators are no longer sufﬁcient to offset exploitation by defectors.
Note that for small c/b, the cluster size keeps increasing as invasion progresses, but this is
not true for larger c/b-ratios, where cooperators break up into smaller clusters of similar size.
As c/b increases and approaches λ, the cluster size steadily decreases, but it cannot become ar-
bitrarily small. In our case, cluster sizes of at least 50 cooperators seem to be required to sustain
cooperation. The decrease in cluster size is accompanied by an increase in the cluster count.
Interestingly, the cluster count exhibits a peak near c/b = 0.13. For larger c/b, the cluster size
keeps decreasing at a slow rate, whilethe cluster count drops quickly, which leads to an increase
in the distance between adjacent clusters. This repulsion between clusters of cooperators arises
from those fortunate defectors that are able to exploit several clusters simultaneously. Their
high payoffs increase their chances to invade and usually destroy some clusters. Increasing the
typical distance between clusters reduces this risk.
The small variance in the size of contiguous clusters indicates that a typical cluster size ex-
ists as c/b approaches λ. This is remarkable because in closely related equilibriumsystems, this
limit leads to diverging ﬂuctuations in the frequency of cooperators (Szab´ o & Hauert, 2002a,b).
Hence, the ﬂuctuations are caused by variations in the number of clusters rather than their sizes.
For c/b < 0.1 no typical cluster size exists and cooperators usually expand as a single large
cluster. The cluster size distribution is bi-modal due to a number of tiny runaway clusters along
the periphery (see Fig. 2a).
For 0.1 < c/b < λ a typical cluster size exists, which deﬁnes the relevant spatial scale for
local processes. This means that as the invasion progresses, the typical cluster size becomes
much smaller than the overall area covered by the invading cooperators (see Fig. 2b). In this
case, the system can approach local equilibrium in areas behind the invasion front. This is
supported by the conditional probability that a neighbour of a cooperator is another cooperator,
qc|c, which quickly reaches its equilibrium value during the ﬁrst growth phase (not shown).
11In contrast, if cooperators expand as a single cluster with embedded specks of defectors (see
Fig. 2a), these specks are not in proper equilibrium because their background keeps expanding.
Nevertheless, qc|c rapidly changes during the ﬁrst phase and increases only slowly during the
second phase (not shown). The time when qc|c ceases to change rapidly coincides with the
transition from the ﬁrst to the second growth phase; this further supports that the ﬁrst phase
constitutes a local equilibration process.
3.4 Cluster Shape
Under increasingly hostile conditions for cooperators (larger c/b-values), the cluster shape be-
comes more and more important. Compact and convex cluster shapes maximize interactions
with other cooperators and minimize exploitation by defectors. The shape of a single cluster γs
can be deﬁned as theratio of interactionswithinthecluster, A, to interactionswith thesurround-
ing defectors, P. Thus, γs is reminiscentof an area-to-periphery ratio (A/P). In continuoustwo
dimensionalspacetheratioA/P 2 isinvariantwithrespect to theclustersize. Unfortunately,this
invariance no longer holds in discrete lattice space. In order to take this into account, the shape
γn of each cluster is normalized such that a single line of cooperators (minimal A, maximal
P) yields γn = 0 whereas a square of cooperators (close to the maximum for A and minimum
for P) returns γn = 1, irrespective of the cluster size. The mean (normalized) cluster shape γ
is weighted by the cluster size to eliminate distortions due to renegade cooperators along the
invasion front (see Fig. 3b). γ exhibits the same two distinct dynamical regimes as the cluster
size and count (cf. Fig. 3a). For c/b < 0.1, γ is surprisingly small due to the embedded specks
of defectors and exhibits large variations because of their variable numbers. For c/b > 0.1, γ
quickly increases as numerous small compact clusters of cooperators form.
124 Conclusions
Under favourable conditions, i.e. for low costs and high beneﬁts, cooperators are able to in-
vade a spatially extended world of defectors. The ability to form clusters enables cooperators to
persist, because spatial aggregation enables more frequent interactions with other cooperators
while reducing exploitation by defectors. The invasion of cooperators occurs in two phases:
During the ﬁrst phase, the number of cooperators increases slowly because the expansion of
cooperators is partly offset by defectors invading the initial cluster of cooperators. The ﬁrst
phase thus establishes a local equilibrium between cooperators and defectors. Consequently,
the duration of this phase depends on the size of the initial cluster and can be neglected if the
invasion was initiated by few cooperators. During the second phase, cooperators uniformly ex-
pand into defector territory. Under increasingly hostile conditions (larger c/b), the expansion
speed decreases but the number of cooperators always increases according to a quadratic func-
tion. Interestingly, cooperators and defectors readily ﬁnd themselves in a local equilibrium in
the wake of the invasion front. Such local equilibration is a fast process compared to the inva-
sion dynamics (or in contrast to global equilibration), a ﬁnding that has also been recognized in
analytical studies using the technique of pair approximation (Le Gaillard et al., 2003, Matsuda
et al., 1992, van Baalen & Rand, 1998). Due to the fast equilibration, good estimates of the
equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors can be obtained already from the invasion
process (see Table 1). In fact, the dynamics in early stages already predicts the evolutionary fate
of cooperators and defectors.
The difference between local and global dynamics suggests a natural separation of time
scales. This is used to calculate the ﬁxation probability of cooperators, ρC, in the limit of
weak selection (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). Note that for the update rule chosen here, ρC < 1/S2
always holds (S2 denotes the population size). Thus, the probability that a single cooperator
takes over is always less than that of a neutral mutant. This remains true if several cooperators
13attempt to invade as compared to an equal number of neutral mutants. However, even though
evolutionarydynamicsneverfavours cooperation, cooperators and defectors may co-existforan
exceedingly long time. In the absence of mutations, any ﬁnite system with a stochastic update
rule must eventually reach a homogeneous absorbing state with all defectors or all cooperators,
but whether these states can be reached within reasonable time is a rather different question
(Taylor et al., 2006, Traulsen et al., 2007). The outcome not only strongly depends on the
population size, but also on the existence and stability of (local) equilibria where cooperators
and defectors can co-exist (Traulsen et al., 2006a,b). Thus, whether cooperators manage to
invade a population of defectors is largely independent of whether they take over the population
and displace defectors.
Theinvasionofcooperatorscan essentiallyunfoldaccording totwodistinctscenarios: under
benign conditions (small c/b-ratios), cooperators expand and form a single large contiguous
and continuously growing cluster interspersed with little specks of defectors (see Fig. 2a). In
contrast, under hostile conditions (large c/b-values), cooperators split up and form numerous
smaller compact clusters of a typical size and the embedded specks disappear (see Fig. 2b). The
typical size decreases with increasing values of c/b, but once it drops below a threshold size,
cooperation can no longer be sustained and disappears. Under hostile conditions, cooperators
break up and form numerous isolated clusters of increasingly convex shape (see Fig. 3b), which
reduces interactions with defectors and thus minimizes exploitation.
Spatial structures, or limited local interactions, lead to assortment. The strength and type
of assortment depends on the geometry, the payoffs as well as on the update rules. In the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma, the formation of clusters generates positive assortment of cooperator-
cooperator interactions, which is crucial for their survival. Under harsher conditions (larger
c/b), positive assortment becomes more important, as reﬂected in the increasingly convex
shapes. At some point (c/b > λ), the assortment required to offset exploitation by defectors can
be no longer achieved and cooperators disappear. Pair approximation deals analytically with
14assortment up to ﬁrst order, but cannot be easily extended to account for macroscopic features
such as cluster count, size and shape. The present study provides a ﬁrst numerical attempt to
link macroscopic features and microscopic mechanisms.
The characteristics of the invasionprocess are robust with respect to variationsof thesystem
size or modiﬁcations of the update rules. Changing from asynchronous to synchronous popula-
tion updates (overlapping versus non-overlapping generations) and adopting different rules for
strategy propagation – e.g. based on the Moran process (Moran, 1962, Nowak et al., 2004) or
referring to situations where errors or uncertainties may lead to the adoption of worse perform-
ing strategies (Hauert & Szab´ o, 2005, Szab´ o & T˝ oke, 1998) – introduce only minor corrections
to quantitative features such as the invasion speed, equilibrium estimates or the maximum c/b-
ratio for which cooperators can persist.
The macroscopic spatio-temporal patterns emerging through the invasion of cooperators
in a spatially extended world of defectors reveal characteristic features of the underlying mi-
croscopic interactions and provide an outlook on the long-term behaviour of the system. The
cluster size of cooperators reﬂects the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio of cooperation, and the local equi-
librium of cooperators and defectors behind the invasion front provides good estimates for the
global equilibrium frequencies of the two strategies at a much later evolutionary stage.
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19Table
c/b initial cluster size a1 d1 a2 d2 T ftheory
c fsims
c
0.02 3 × 3 3.34 1.17 0.14 2.07 1683 0.849 0.932
0.02 30 × 30 51.14 0.80 0.36 1.95 1625 0.848 0.932
0.12 3 × 3 1.11 1.03 0.01 2.06 6515 0.519 0.578
0.12 30 × 30 44.51 0.43 0.02 1.94 6280 0.514 0.578
Table 1: Fit and simulation data characterizing the invasion of cooperators for two different
initial cluster sizes and two cost-to-beneﬁt ratios. The number of cooperators nc(t) increases
according to nc(t) = aitdi, where i refers to the ﬁrst and second growth phase (cf. Fig. 1b).
T indicates the number of generations until the ﬁrst cooperator reaches the boundary on a
10002 lattice (averaged over 100 runs). The estimated and simulated equilibrium fractions of
cooperators are given by f
theory
c (see Eq. (3)) and fsims
c , respectively.
20Figures
Figure1: Survival probability σC and growth characteristics of invading cooperators. a For initial
cluster sizes of s×s with s ≥ 3, the survival probability is close to 1 and essentially independent
of s (△,s = 3; ⋄,s = 5; •,s = 15) and the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio c/b up to the extinction threshold
λ ≈ 0.15, where cooperators can no longer survive irrespective of their initial abundance. σC is
determined over 1000 runs on a 115×115 lattice and cooperators are assumed to survive if they
reached the boundary. b The growth of the number of cooperators nc(t) displays two distinct
regimes: A ﬁrst phase of slow growth that corresponds to a local equilibration process of the
initial cluster, followed by a second phase representing the expansion of cooperators. Both
regimes follow a power function of the form nc(t) = aitdi but with distinct growth exponents
(d1 < 1 in the ﬁrst phase and d2 ≈ 2 in the second phase; see Table 1). The dashed line shows
the superposition of the two ﬁts nc(t) = a1td1 +a2td2. Vertical lines mark the end of the ﬁrst (T1)
and the beginning of the second growth phase (T2) as used for ﬁtting the power function. The
expansion process is shown for a 30 × 30 cluster on a 10002 lattice averaged over 100 runs.
Figure 2: Typical snapshots of the invasion of cooperators (blue) in a world of defectors (red) for
a small cost-to-beneﬁt ratio (c/b = 0.02) and b for c/b closer to the extinction threshold (c/b =
0.12). Along the interface separating cooperators and defectors, some individuals recently
switched from defection to cooperation (green) or vice versa (yellow). a Cooperators expand
as a single contiguous cluster with embedded specks of defectors, and a few isolated tiny
cooperator formations along the invasion front. In this snapshot there is one large cluster of
size 23187 accompanied by 14 single, isolated cooperators and the average weighted cluster
shape is γ = 0.078. The fraction of cooperators is fc = 0.58 and qc|c = 0.89. b Cooperators form
numerous small compact clusters. There are 143 clusters ranging from a single cooperator to
a cluster of size 1987, with a weighted average size of 537 and shape γ = 0.356. The fraction of
cooperators is fc = 0.37 and qc|c = 0.76. The snapshots are shown for an initial 15 × 15 cluster
on a 2002 lattice and can be reproduced using the VirtualLabs (Hauert, 2006b).
21Figure 3: Macroscopic features of the invasion of cooperators: a cluster size (•) and count (⋄)
as well as b cluster shape γ for increasing cost-to-beneﬁt ratios c/b. a As suggested by the
snapshots in Fig. 2, the cluster size decreases with c/b, while the number of clusters increases.
For c/b < 0.1, few sizeable clusters dominate the expansion, which means that the cluster size
keeps increasing as invasion continues. In contrast, the big clusters break up and numerous
small clusters are formed for c/b > 0.1. b The same two distinct regimes are reﬂected in the
mean cluster shape γ weighted by the cluster size. For c/b < 0.1, γ is very low because of
numerous embedded specks of defectors but displays a large variance due to their variable
numbers. In contrast, compact clusters with convex shapes form for c/b > 0.1 such as to
minimize interactions with defectors. For an initial cluster of 15 × 15 cooperators, the cluster
size, count and shape are determined when cooperators reach the boundary of a 1152 lattice
and averaged over 1000 runs. Cluster size and shape are weighted by the cluster size (see
text). Vertical bars indicate the standard deviation (the standard error lies within the size of the
symbols).
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